Family ties

The first article[i] (see October 14 post) in this series on Philippine Development concluded with the statement “…the “rules of the game” …and how these are enforced remain unpredictable. And unpredictability is anathema to strategic development planning and sustained economic growth.”

In that article, we asked “What explains the unpredictability?” The next two (2) books in the course’s reading list provide some useful insights.

McCoy (1994) hints that the root of the problem with the unpredictable rules and its enforcement lies in the character of Filipino kinship. Quoting Jurg Helbling, McCoy explained that bilateral kinship[ii] “produces overlapping egocentric networks,” fostering societies “characterized by vagueness and ambiguity, if not by disorder.”

Hutchcroft (1998), on the other hand, posits that the “patrimonial features” of Philippine society “hinder the development of more advanced forms of capitalist accumulation” and “presents particularly obstinate structural barriers to the creation of a more rational-legal state.”

Why is this importance given to kinship and family[iii] in Philippine society considered a problem?

McCoy argues that it leads to a situation that restricts “freedom of entry” into the market. Market access is restricted through regulation and awarding access to a favoured few. Extreme restriction creates a monopoly and the consequences for the economy, as a whole, based on McCoys analysis, is decidedly negative. The political competition for such monopolies is called “rent-seeking.”

Hutchcroft finds patrimonial polities as highly arbitrary, where the “degree of calculability” is very weak, presenting major obstacles to the development of more advanced forms of capitalist accumulation. Hutchcroft derives his insights from Weber who highlighted the dependence of modern capitalism on an administrative and legal structure able to promote “political and procedural predictability.”

Patrimonial oligarchic state
Hutchcroft describes the Philippine state as a “patrimonial oligarchic state.” This means that it is the powerful business class that extracts privilege from a largely incoherent bureaucracy. Which is different from a “patrimonial administrative state[iv]” that can be found in Indonesia and Thailand, where it is the bureaucratic elite that extracts privilege from a weak business class. Hutchcroft calls the economic system where a patrimonial oligarchic state arises as booty capitalism. In this system, a group with an economic base outside the state is plundering the state for particularistic resources.

Hutchcroft characterises the Philippine economy as a rent-seeking economy, where “ownership of property alone guarantees the access to wealth” in contrast with a profit-seeking economic structure where “assets and income are won and lost on the basis of the ability of the business owner to develop the property.”

In other words and using the metaphor of a basketball game, a player in a patrimonial oligarchic state can win the game simply by being a relative of or friends with the referee and those who determine the rules of the game.

This implies, however, that “games can still be won” so to speak, even if it is won by the same players. In other words, economic growth can still be achieved, even if some players who are relatives and friends of the referees are favoured and are able to monopolise the game. Not so, says McCoy. Quoting the economist James Buchanan, McCoy explains that monopolisation involves “a net destruction of value as the rents secured only reflect a diversion of value from consumers generally to the favoured rent-seeker,” thereby resulting in “a net loss of value in the process.” In our basketball game metaphor, no one appreciates a game that is rigged.

Crony capitalism
Hutchcroft claims that in the 1970s, authoritarianism was seen by some quarters as a necessary prelude to development and regime change was seen as the solution to lacklustre economic performance. When Marcos declared Martial Law, according to Hutchcroft, he pledged reforms that would usher in equality of opportunity and save the country from “an oligarchy that appropriated for itself power and bounty.” But what happened was, a new oligarchy (of Marcos and his relatives and cronies) achieved dominance in many economic sectors.

The above statement clearly shows that even the strongman Marcos succumbed to the temptations generated by adherence to the obligations inherent in maintaining kinship ties. His success as a leader depended on his ability to continuously deliver favours to his relatives, friends and supporters rather than on him wielding vast state powers.

The case of the warlord Durano in Northern Cebu provides further insight to cases similar to that of Marcos that is prevalent in many parts of the country. The case study shows that Durano’s kinship network (composed of patrons, family members, and local supporters) “sustained him and made possible his long tenure as the political kingpin of the North (Cebu).”

Attempts at reform
In the banking sector, technocratic competence was one of the common prescriptions for reform in the early 1970s, during the time of Marcos. But this was hobbled by a] the absence of the technocrats’ own power base, and b] absence of support from an effective bureaucracy below them.

During the time of Ramos in the early 1990s, liberalisation and economic reforms, according to Hutchcroft, were the compelling prescriptions for change. The Ramos reforms began with the liberalisation of foreign exchange in 1992, followed by trade liberalisation in subsequent years, and foreign investment has also been liberalised.

While Hutchcroft’s book was being written in 1998, the freshest initiative at reforms of the Ramos administration then was its concerted attack, led by Jose Almonte, a retired military officer, on cartels and monopolies and the oligarchic privilege that nurtured them. Hutchcroft writes that the first target was the moribund and inefficient telecommunications industry, dominated by PLDT[v]. Within just a few years, PLDT was providing better service and making more money although new competitors saw it as uncooperative in facilitating interconnections of rival systems. At present, we know that other industries (banking, transportation, shipping) have also been deregulated.

As a result of the economic reforms during the time or Ramos annual GNP growth returned to respectable levels (5.1% in 1994, 5.7% in 1995 and nearly 7% for 1996).

What now?
Despite these achievements, Hutchcroft warns that there are still political and institutional obstacles (or deficiencies?) to sustained economic growth and development. Hutchcroft makes the following observations:

1. those who resisted reforms can sometimes still prevail
2. there is yet little evidence of the creation of a broad social coalition able to sustain reform pressures in future years[vi]
3. there is still a need for reforms in the political process still dominated by traditional politicians or trapos.
4. and lastly, Philippine state institutions are showing themselves to be incapable of providing the necessary political and institutional foundations required even by the laissez-faire mode of development.

Overall, Hutchcroft echoes the conclusion in the first article (see October 14 post) in this series along the lines that “it is difficult to instil long-term investor confidence when a high degree of arbitrariness reigns in the political and legal spheres.” He quotes Almonte who said that the hardest reforms – those requiring sustained administrative capacity – are yet to come.

As Almonte declares, as quoted by Hutchcroft, “rich and powerful families could still prove stronger than the forces of reform.”

References
McCoy, Alfred (ed.) (1994). An anarchy of families: state in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press

Hutchcroft, Paul D. (1998). Booty capitalism: the politics of banking in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press

Endnotes
[i] The key questions for this third article are: 1] What is the impact of continuing clan and dynastic politics on Philippine development?, and 2] What political deficiencies continue to obstruct capitalist development in the Philippines?
[ii] In bilateral kinship, ancestry is traced through both the mother’s and the father’s line. Effective kinship ties are maintained with relatives of both parents.
[iii] McCoy explained, that in political terms in the Philippines, the word family does simply mean household; it has a broader connotation that includes a wider working coalition drawn from a larger group related by blood, marriage, and ritual. He called this coalition kinship network.
[iv] Hutchcroft calls the capitalism system where “patrimonial administrative state” arises as “bureaucratic” capitalism.
[v] Philippine Long Distance Company.
[vi] Hutchcroft sees the task for creating this broad coalition more difficult by the historical absence of any thorough programme of land distribution.

Beyond land

The two (2) questions for this article are:
· Is agrarian reform still a relevant requisite for Philippine development?
· Why has the Philippines failed to industrialise?

Quick answers
The first book that was used as reference for this article, the one written by James Putzel, was published in 1992, more than fourteen (14) years ago. Putzel’s answer to the question at that time was:

Redistributive agrarian reform could make a major contribution to future development and peace in the Philippines, primarily by strengthening the foundations of civil society. (Putzel 1992, p. 381)

Putzel made a distinction between two (2) general types of agrarian reform: a reform that focused on agricultural productivity (conservative approach) and one that emphasised redistribution of the principal resource in agriculture, land (revolutionary and liberal approaches). His bias seems to lie in the latter approaches, specifically the liberal approach.
So to him, at the time of the publication of his book A captive land: politics of Agrarian reform in the Philippines in 1992, agrarian reform was still very much relevant, with the redistributive agenda at the core of the agrarian reform programme, that is.

Rivera (1994), for his part, saw agrarian reform as key to industrialization. In the book Landlords and capitalists: class, family and state in Philippine manufacturing, Rivera pointed out that agrarian reform[i] is key in raising mass incomes and creating a strong internal market that would have allowed the Philippines to make the leap towards sustained production of intermediate and capital goods (industrialization).

Rivera wrote the book above in 1994, twelve (12) years ago and just six (6) years after the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). It is now twenty (20) years since the enactment of CARL and the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and yet the Philippines is still not an industrialised or even an industrialising country.

The figures on the accomplishments of CARP are confusing. DAR (2007) claims that 6.95 million hectares of land has been distributed, representing 76% accomplishment out of the 9.12 million hectares of land under the coverage of the programme. It is not clear how many of the estimated 4 million families[ii] dependent on agriculture benefited from the programme, out of the estimated twelve (12) million households in the country.

Failure to industrialise
At present, if we explore the link between agrarian reform and industrialisation as discussed in Rivera’s book mentioned above, it could be argued that one of the reasons for the country’s continuing failure to industrialise lies in the weaknesses in the implementation of CARP. For one, the implementation of the programme was confined to rice and corn lands[iii]. Which means that a lot of lands are still in the control of oligarchs and masses of people remain to have no access to this important capital asset. If this analytical trajectory is followed, it would point one to the conclusion that the country’s failure to industrialise stems from a situation in which the state is still very much dominated by landed oligarchs whose interests are in contradiction with the interests of those promoting industrialisation.

Which is essentially a repeat of what happened in the 1950s to the 1970s, during the time when the dominant economic strategy in the Philippines was import-substituting industrialisation (ISI). According to Rivera, the country’s failure to sustain the high productivity rates in the manufacturing sector at that time was due to the confluence of three (3) interrelated factors:

1. the persistence of an economic and social structure marked by pervasive inequitable distribution of resources ad dramatised by the land problem,
2. the internal contradictory set of interests of the local ISI manufacturers themselves leading to a weak commitment to any coherent strategy of development, and
3. the absence of a relatively autonomous, developmentalist state apparatus that could provide the essential environment for sustained industrial growth.

Land as capital asset
Land is only one of the capital assets that people use to make a living or improve their lives[iv]. In the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) of the Department for International Development (DfID), there are five (5) capital assets that humans make use of to improve their lives. These are: human, financial, physical, social and natural capital. Land or access to land is a form of natural capital.

A redistributive agrarian reform aims to improve peoples’ stock of natural capital. Whether they are able to productively make use of this capital asset, along with their other capital assets is completely another matter. How the policy environment is defined and enforced also affects people’s ability to create more value out the capital assets at their disposal.

The Philippines has a total land area of thirty (30) million hectares. Of this land area, forty-seven percent (47%) or 15 million hectares, is classified as agricultural; fifty percent (50%) or 15 million hectares as forestlands and the other three percent (3%) is specified for built-up and other uses[v] (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Land use classification in the Philippines

According to the DAR Accomplishment Report of June 2007, the coverage of CARP was 9.12 million hectares (30% of the country’s total land area). Of the 9.12 million hectares, 3.96 million hectares (43%) are actually lands that were formerly classified as forestlands. This means that of the 14 million hectares of agricultural lands, only 5.16 million hectares (37%) were included under CARP. This leaves 8.84 million hectares of agricultural lands (63%) that can still be subjected to a redistributive programme.

These 8.84 million hectares could be planted to commercial crops (sugar, banana, pineapple, mangoes, coconuts, etc.) but I was not able to get a breakdown on the specific uses of these lands. There was also no figure of how many households are employed in companies that operate in these lands.

Beyond land
Should the agricultural lands not covered by CARP be “roped in” a redistributive agrarian reform programme? So that, as some theorists argue, the mass incomes of people working in these lands could be increased and thereby stimulate industrial growth and peace as social justice would have been achieved? Or would this create the opposite effect, i.e. more poverty and social conflict?

To answer this question, one needs to look at the specific characteristics of these lands. Can these lands be made more productive in smaller parcels or are they more productive if managed in larger units[vi]? In these types of crops, what size of land units would stimulate the use of industrial farm machineries? CARP covered only thirty percent (30%) of the total households of the country, how many households would be affected by including these lands in a redistributive agrarian reform programme? Is land ownership the only option in terms of achieving a socially equitable sharing of the benefits gained from these lands?

A redistributive agrarian reform program may be likened to putting all our eggs in one basket, when there are four (4) other capital assets (human, physical, social and financial) that need to be explored. For instance, based on my own experience in staying in so many rural communities in the Philippines and in some countries in Southeast Asia, I have seen that many children of farmers and fishers go to urban centres to look for non-agriculture or non-fishery-based sources of incomes, using mainly their human assets (physical labour mainly but also their knowledge and skills in many other areas apart from those that are agriculture or fishery-related). The children who decided to stay behind had to share with their parents or even compete with them over the very minimal capital assets (land or access to a fishery) that are present in their communities.

Perhaps on top of agrarian reform (liberal or conservative or a combination), what is needed is a programme that explores ways of creating value out of people’s capital assets beyond land.


Endnotes
[i] Rivera wasn’t explicit in the type of agrarian reform that he mentioned in the book, but it appears to be the redistributive or liberal type of agrarian reform.

[ii] See Putzel (1992), p 26.

[iii] Actually, CARP also included former forestlands under the jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

[iv] For a discussion of the other capital assets, please see: http://www.livelihoods.org/

[v] See House Bill 170, An Act Providing for the National Land Use Code of the Philippines and other Purposes, introduced by Heherson Alvarez in the 11th Congress of the Philippines in http://erbl.pids.gov.ph/listbills.phtml?id=37.

[vi] Some people lament that they find it ironic that the country’s rice production for instance has plummeted when the Philippines is host to the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), compared to say Thailand whose agricultural experts were only trained at the University of the Philippines Los Baños. It has been pointed out that the rice production per unit area in the Philippines is still higher than that of Thailand. Although Thailand has a bigger land area (51 million hectares compared to only 30 million hectares of the Philippines) so overall they can produce more rice than the Philippines.

References
DAR (2007). Status of Agrarian Reform Implementation as of June 2007. Quezon City: Department of Agrarian Reform.

Putzel, James (1992). Captive land: politics of agrarian reform in the Philippines. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations.

Rivera, Temario (1994). Landlords and capitalists: class, family and state in Philippine manufacturing. Quezon City: Center for Integrative Development Studies/University of the Philippines

_________(Undated). Philippine Forest Figures. See: http://rainforests.mongabay.com/20philippines.htm

Unpredictable

This article addresses two questions under the theme “The Philippine Development Puzzle.” The questions are:

· Why does development continue to elude the Philippines?
· Why are states important for economic growth and for the social transformation that go with it?

The main reference for the first question is a book that contained a collection of articles edited by Balisacan and Hill (2003) and for the second question, the book of Doronila (1992) constituted the main source of information and ideas.

Definition and measures of development
Both books defined “development” based on economic growth, where the GDP (gross domestic product) is used as the indicator. The term “development” is often times understood as synonymous with “welfare,” and “well-being” or “improved living condition” although measures of welfare, well-being and improved living condition have not gained much currency yet, except for the HDI (human development index which is a combined measure of literacy, life expectancy and GDP per capita in a country). Bergheim (2006) contends that GDP was not designed to measure welfare or well-being and only measures the market value of the final goods and services in a country. For Bergheim, the “ultimate goal” is happiness and this could be measured through life satisfaction surveys to come up with a “happiness index.”

There are other broader measures of well-being and improved living conditions but this article would focus on the more “traditional” measures such as GDP as was done in the two main reference books and would include the HDI as another measure in the discussion.

Deteriorating economic performance
Balisacan and Hill (2003) are puzzled by the economic performance of the Philippines during the period 1898 to 2000. They aver that among the newly independent countries, the initial conditions in the Philippines were favorable: American colonial rule had been comparatively benign, there were no serious communal or ethnic divides, educational standards were among the highest in the developing world, the country had privileged access to the world’s largest economy, the country’s civil institutions were comparatively well-developed, it had a reasonably democratic political system, the press was open and vigorous, the judiciary and legal system were quite well developed and somewhat independent, and finally the country possessed ample agricultural lands to sustain several decades of rapid economic growth.

Yet, as Balisacan and Hill (2003) assert, the Philippines development outcomes in the last century until 2000 have been disappointing. They say that the country’s per capita income has been overtaken by Korea and Taiwan in the 1950s, Thailand in the 1970s, and China in the 1990s. They further state that the country became an increasingly marginal player in the region’s trade and investments flows and in consequence, its social indicators stagnated, in marked contrast to the situation in its high-growth neighbors.

Brief history of Philippine economic development strategies
For at least the last 1,000 years, the Philippine economy has always been tied to the regional or global economy and its history may be loosely divided into five (5) phases:

1. Maritime trade within Southeast Asia before the arrival of the West.[i] Archaeological finds suggest that even before the arrival of the Spaniards, there were already merchant vessels sailing though Southeast Asia bringing trade and commerce to the Philippine Islands. The vessels carried ceramics and other commodities from China, Vietnam and Thailand. This was not discussed in the two (2) principal reference books, therefore there is no description available on the general contours of the economy at this time, when the Philippines was not even known as the Philippines yet. As there was no Philippine state yet, the institutions[ii] that shaped and governed economic behavior must have been informal in nature.

2. Era of Mercantilism or The Manila-Acapulco Galleon trade (1565 to 1815)[iii]. During this time, the Southeast Asian maritime trade was connected to Mexico and Europe. This was also not described in the principal reference books. The Philippines was already a colony of Spain during this period.

3. International Commerce through Agricultural Exports (1834 to 1949)[iv]. According to Doronila (1992), the opening of Manila in 1834 and key provincial ports in the next decades to international commerce signaled a shift of Spanish economic policy from mercantilism and established new patterns of economic development in the Philippine islands. During this period, the economy basically rested on four (4) agricultural crops – sugarcane, hemp (abaca), tobacco and coffee – as exports. And the main markets for these products were America and Britain, instead of Spain. This period paved the way for the emergence of “caciquism” where powerful landowners gained control of political institutions (De Dios and Hutchcroft in Balisacan and Hill 2003).

4. Import-Substituting Industrialization or ISI (1950s to 1970s). After the Second World War, economic policy shifted towards ISI. This resulted in the increased prominence of the secondary sector[v] (manufacturing) that grew from 10.7% of GDP in 1948 to 17.9% in 1960 (De Dios and Hutchcroft 2003). ISI gave rise to the emergence of an “industrial interest” in the country[vi] although many family conglomerates that dominated the agro-export sector since 1830s up to the 1940s moved towards a more diversified mix of interests in agriculture, industry, commerce, real state and finance.

5. Export-Oriented Industrialization or EOI (roughly 1970s to present). The adoption of the EOI policy strategy has it roots in the 1970s with the enactment of the Exports Incentives Act of 1971 but development strategies during that time were viewed as incoherent – there was continued promotion of exports but at the same time continued protection of ISI firms (De Dios and Hutchcroft 2003). The EOI policy strategy encouraged the production of goods and services where the country has a “comparative advantage.”

Recent economic and social indicators
Balisacan and Hill’s book was published in 2003 and the country’s recent (2007) economic and social indicators may not be as dismal as what they found four (4) years ago.

For instance, in terms of average GDP growth that was shown in Table 1.1, page 7, in Balisacan and Hill (2003), the average GDP growth of the Philippines for the period 2000 to 2007 has improved. From being the cellar dweller in the period 1990 to 2000 (with an annual average GDP growth of 3.2), it has moved up to number 3 during the period 2000 to 2007 (with an annual average GDP growth of 5.9, Table 1).

Table 1: Average Growth of GDP in Southeast Asia, 1950-2007 (% per annum)

Sources: Lim (2001:38); World Bank (2002), World Development Report 2002 in Balisacan and Hill (2003) and World Bank (2008), World Development Indicators 2008

The country’s HDI (Human Development Index) figures have been steadily increasing. Although of the five (5) Southeast Asian countries mentioned in Table 1, the Philippines has dropped in ranking from second (after Singapore) in 1975 to second from the bottom (before Indonesia) in 2005 (Table 2).

Table 2: HDI figures of selected countries in Southeast Asia, 1975 to 2005

* = Among the 5 South East Asian countries included in the table only.
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2008) Human Development Report 2007/2008

As Table 2 shows, despite the good performance in terms of annual average GDP growth from during the last seven (7) years, the Philippines is clearly still not in the lead pack in the “development race.”

Reasons for poor performance
What explains the country’s poor performance? Based on Table 1, the country’s economic performance plummeted during the decade 1980 to 1990, when the average annual GDP growth was only 1%. Balisacan and Hill (2003) called this period the “lost decade.” Annual GDP growth rate seems to have picked up again in the next two (2) decades. Although as Table 2 shows, the country’s HDI ranking in relation to four (4) of its Asian neighbors, has dropped considerably.

What accounts for the country’s dismal economic performance in the 1980 to 1990s? Balisacan and Hill (2003) contend that there is a large body of literature that attempts to explain international variations in long-term rates of economic growth with reference to a range of policy and country endowment factors. Included in the large set of variables are: macroeconomic outcomes, trade policy, human capital, institutional quality, natural resource endowments, proximity to large economies and initial levels of per capita. Balisacan and Hill, however, say that they are unaware of any systematic testing of such a relationship against Philippine data.

The analytical approach mentioned by Balisacan and Hill above has some similarities with the ideas of Douglass C.North, 1993 Nobel Peace Prize awardee on institutions and the sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) of the United Kingdom’s DFID (Department for International Development). According to North (1993) formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions and self-imposed code of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies. The SLF, on the other hand, presents three (3) major factors that affect people’s livelihood strategies. These are a] vulnerability context (shocks, trends, seasonality), b] capital assets (human, financial, physical, natural and social capital) and c] policies, institutions and processes.

So going back to the attempt to explain the poor economic performance of the Philippines during the “lost decade” and answering the first question of this article, Balisacan and Hill insinuated that the reasons could all boil down to “bad luck.” What they meant actually was a string of “shocks” (in the language of the SLF) that unfortunately took place during the period. These “shocks” were: a] sharp decline in the price of sugar, b] prolonged political and financial crisis (People Power in 1986), series of coup d’etats after that, c] eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991, and d] the Asian economic crisis and severe El Niño-induced drought[vii].

Way forward
Balisacan and Hill (2003) posit that sustained economic growth depends upon the quality of the bureaucracy. Again, this statement finds resonance in the ideas of North (1993) regarding institutions and enforcement characteristics of societies and the SLF’s third factor that affects livelihoods, i.e. policies, institutions and processes.

The two (2) authors state that while incremental measures have been carried out, such as the removal of restrictions on competition[viii], there is still a need for initiatives that require sustained administrative capacity. For example, liberalization of agricultural products require construction of roads, irrigation facilities, extension services and other infrastructure for farmers to improve their productivity and meet the challenges of international competition.

In answer to the second question of this article, states are important in economic growth and social transformation because they enforce the rules (in the language of North) that define the incentive structure in an economy and the performance of governments affects economic strategies adopted by individuals and firms (in the language of the SLF).

Balisacan and Hill wrote their article in 2003 and their conclusions then was that Philippine state institutions have shown themselves incapable of providing the necessary political foundations required even by a laissez-faire model of development that the colonial powers, IMF and the World Bank have been trying to promote in the country. They ended their article by saying that it is difficult to instill long-term investor confidence when a high degree of arbitrariness reigns in the political and legal spheres where economic initiatives are threatened by simmering resentment among the marginalized. In short, the “rules of the game” in the country and how these are enforced remain unpredictable. And unpredictability is anathema to strategic development planning and sustained economic growth. There may have been some positive changes since 2003, which will not be explored in this article.

But what explains the unpredictability? This will be explored in the next articles.

Endnotes
[i] See: http://philmuseum.ueuo.com/nm_museum/nmgallery/5cent2.html
[ii] According to Douglass C. North, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1993, institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies. See: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html
[iii] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manila_Galleon
[iv] See Doronila (1992).
[v] The primary sector being extractive economic activities such as Mining, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.
[vi] The article of De Dios and Hutchcroft, however, did not specify the prominent families who belong to this “industrial interest” group.
[vii] The last two factors occurred in the following decade after the “lost decade,” ie 1990 to 2000.
[viii] The details of this are not discussed here.

References:
Balisacan, Arsenio and Hill, Hall (2003). The Philippine economy: development, policies and challenges. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Bergheim, Stefan (2006). Measures of well-being. Germany: Deutsche Bank Research. See: http://www.dbresearch.com/

De Dios, Emmanuel and Hutchcroft, Paul (2003). Political Economy. In Balisacan, Arsenio and Hill, Hall (2003). The Philippine economy: development, policies and challenges. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

DFID (1997). Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets. United Kingdom: Department for International Development.

Doronila, Amado (1992). The State, economic transformation, and political change in the Philippines, 1946-1972. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

North, Douglass (1993). Economic performance through time. Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1993. Sweden: See: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html

UNDP (2008). Human Development Report 2007/2008. New York: United Nations Development Programme

World Bank (2008). World Development Indicators, 2008. World Bank. See: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=1&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N